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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In order to compensate for growing labor costs, U.S. air carriers have 
recently increased airfares on flights.1  However, the emergence of lost-cost 
carriers (LCCs), who bypass these labor costs, threaten the market 
dominance U.S. carriers have exercised over the last decade.  Deregulation 
and increased liberalization has created a small profit margin that is 
threatened by LCCs who do not face the same labor and operating expenses.  
Foreign carriers are challenging large U.S. carriers, offering dramatically 
lower airfares on transatlantic flights.2  Facing more stringent domestic labor 
standards, U.S. carriers have petitioned the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (USDOT) to reevaluate granting permits for foreign carriers 
with suspect labor practices, generating heightened foreign criticism.3  
On July 25, 2016, this criticism came to a head when the European Union 
(EU) Commissioner for Transport, Violeta Bulc, formally demanded 
arbitration because the USDOT refused to grant Norwegian Air 
International’s (NAI) foreign air carrier permit.4  Though the USDOT has 
since granted the application, the three-year denial raised significant 
concerns about the meaning of Article 17 bis of the U.S.-EU Air Transport 
Agreement (ATA or the Agreement), which is the “core labor protection 
provisions of the agreement.”5  Whether the USDOT should have granted 
NAI a foreign air carrier permit was vigorously contested.  U.S. carriers, 
labor organizations, and several U.S. politicians argue that NAI violates 
express labor standards, which is prohibited under Article 17 bis of the ATA.  
Though Article 17 bis may not provide an explicit basis for denying foreign 
carrier permits, NAI’s application for a foreign air carrier permit should have 
been denied under a proper construction of the article and the USDOT 
permit-granting provisions.6 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Reuters, Your Plane Ticket Just Got More Expensive, FORTUNE (Jan. 6, 2016), http:// 
fortune.com/2016/01/06/airfares-airlines-prices/.  
 2 Josh Lew, Norwegian To Launch Sub-$200 Flights from US to Paris, TRAVEL PULSE (Feb. 
24, 2016), http://www.travelpulse.com/news/airlines/norwegian-to-launch-sub-200-flights-from-
us-to-paris.html. 
 3 See, e.g., Joint Answer of Delta Air Lines, Inc., United Airlines, Inc., and American 
Airlines, Inc., Application of Norwegian Air International Limited, Docket DOT-OST-2013-
0204-0027 (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov.  
 4 Letter from Violeta Bulc, EU Comm’r Transp., to Anthony Foxx, Sec’y Transp., U.S. 
Dep’t Transp. (July 25, 2016), https://ialpa.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Com 
missioner-Bulc-letter-to-Secretary-Foxx.pdf. 
 5 John D. Porcari, Setting The Record Straight On Norwegian Air And The US-EU Open 
Skies Agreement, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Aug. 27, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/john-d-porcari/setting-the-record-straig_b_10704160.html. 
 6 See infra Part III. 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2018  1:56 PM 
2018] AVOIDING DEADSTICK 517 
 
Part II of this Note canvases the trend from closed skies to bilateral 
agreements to present day open skies agreements, specifically examining 
how the airline industry’s move towards liberalization has undermined 
organized labor requiring the creation of Article 17 bis of the ATA.  Next, 
Part III addresses the respective international labor laws that regulate airline 
employees and their collective relationship with management.  Part IV 
analyzes whether Article 17 bis of the ATA includes the granting of air 
carrier certificates, and whether intentional violation of labor standards can 
be a basis for denying certification under the ATA.  From that analysis, this 
Note will argue that the USDOT inappropriately granted NAI’s foreign 
carrier permit under Article 17 bis. Finally, in Part V, the Note concludes 
with a look towards future considerations for the third phase of the ATA and 
the pending U.S. legislation to limit foreign air carrier permits.  
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: OPENING THE SKIES 
While commercial aviation has become routine, the standards and 
practices governing the skies remain “stuck in the past.”7  This remains 
largely true because much of the foundation for present day air transport 
agreements were made in the aftermath of World War II.  During the war the 
United States began to look ahead “with the hope of using its military aircraft 
for civilian purposes.”8  This hope prompted a convention to address these 
desires and opened negotiations for air travel cooperation.  Nations 
simultaneously attempted to open flight routes while limiting foreign 
ownership of their air carriers—an issue that remains unsettled today.  
Invariably, every move toward open skies between the United States and 
Europe correspondingly affected airline workers and their ability to protect 
themselves in the changing landscape.  
A.  Early Moves Towards Bilateral Agreements 
In 1944, the United States hosted the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation (Chicago Convention), bringing together fifty-four other nations.9  
At that time, the United States had “a more developed commercial air carrier 
industry while European air carriers tended to be government-owned and 
                                                                                                                   
 7 Charles A. Hunnicutt, U.S.-EU Second Stage Air Transport Agreement: Toward an Open 
Aviation Area, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 663, 666 (2011).  
 8 E. Rebecca Kreis, A Comparative Analysis of the Aviation Network Within the European 
Community and the Ad-Hoc Network Between the U.S. and Central America, 24 TRANSP. L.J. 
303, 307 (1997). 
 9 Id.   
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focused.”10  This difference became important when recovering nations 
rebuked the United States’ push for more liberal aviation rights.  In the end, 
fifty-two nations agreed to the 1944 Chicago Convention, creating the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)11 under the auspices of the 
U.N.  
Additionally, the Chicago Convention established the first five “freedoms 
of the air.”12  The first two freedoms were universally accepted: the right to 
pass over a nation’s territory without landing and the right to land in that 
nation for non-traffic purposes.13  Whereas, the latter three freedoms were 
not as widely accepted.14  Still, the Chicago Convention provided the 
necessary first step for nations to cooperate on subsequent bilateral air 
transport agreements, expanding the latter three freedoms and liberalization 
going forward.15   
The first notable bilateral agreement was between the United Kingdom 
and the United States in 1946—Bermuda I.  Bermuda I was a bilateral 
agreement that reaffirmed first and second freedom rights to its signatories 
and extended third, fourth, and fifth freedom rights (a drastic step beyond the 
agreement at the Chicago Convention).16  Furthering the push for 
liberalization, nations could determine capacity limits for flights so long as 
they related to “traffic requirements” on the individual routes and “airline 
operation.”17  Rates were tied to the “rate conference machinery” of the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA).18  Consequently, Bermuda I 
became a template for subsequent bilateral agreements.19  
                                                                                                                   
 10 Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 667.  
 11 Id.   
 12 Kreis, supra note 8, at 308. 
 13 Air Services Agreement, U.S.-U.K., Feb. 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 1499 [hereinafter Bermuda 
I]; Manual on the Regulation of International Air Transport, Doc 9626, Part 4, INT’L CIV. 
AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/Pages/freedomsAir.aspx. 
 14 The third freedom of the air is the right to land in the granting nation’s territory for traffic 
purposes.  A nation granting fourth freedom of the air rights allows a country’s air carriers to 
pick up passengers in the foreign nation for purposes of transporting them back to their home 
country.  Finally, the fifth freedom rights permit a nation to use the granting nation as an 
intermediary stop in passage to a third-party nation, allowing the pick-up and drop-off of 
passengers along the way.  Manual on the Regulation of International Air Transport, Doc 
9626, Part 4, supra note 13.  
 15 Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 668.  
 16 Id. at 669. 
 17 Bermuda I, supra note 13, at Annex VI (a)–(c). 
 18 Id. at Annex II(b).  Due to the desire to manage international rates and fares but 
impracticability in doing so, governments turned to the IATA (an independent agency) to 
determine appropriate rates and fares that would “not involve cut-throat competition, while 
ensuring that they could be set as low as possible, in the interests of consumers.”  Early Days, 
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However, the U.K. decided to unilaterally end Bermuda I in 1976, forcing 
the United States to agree to stricter measures under Bermuda II just a year 
later.20  Bermuda II was hailed as “a successful attempt by the British to 
remove some of the excess capacity of United States’ carriers in the United 
Kingdom.”21  Under Bermuda II, air carriers were limited to a few gateways 
in the opposing country’s airports and had their capacities subject to review 
by one another.22  Bermuda II was a protectionist effort to push against the 
U.S. airline industry deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s.23  Ultimately, 
Bermuda II remained in effect until the signing of the ATA in 2007.24  
While bilateral agreements, like Bermuda II, evidenced a global trend 
towards protectionism, U.S. policy makers were domestically deregulating 
the airline industry.  By the 1970s, the civil aviation industry continued to 
rely on an antique framework established by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 
193825 and the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.26  These acts created a bloated 
bureaucracy that sheltered the airline industry from traditional market forces 
with elaborate political protections.  Under this system, the Civil Aeronautics 
Board (CAB) was responsible for determining: which airlines could provide 
long-haul service, what routes carriers were allowed to fly, and what fares 
each carrier could charge for those routes.27  For example, CAB required 
elaborate hearings when fare changes were requested to determine whether 
the recommended change would be adopted.28  These restrictions were so 
stringent that in the forty years since the Civil Aeronautics Act “CAB did not 
allow the entry of a single new trunk airline.”29  By 1975, the airline industry 
could best be described as “a forty-year old still living at home with his 
parents,” explained then CAB Chairman John Robson.30  The airline industry 
had outgrown these regulations.    
                                                                                                                   
INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASSOC., http://www.iata.org/about/Pages/history-early-days.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2017). 
 19 Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 668–90.  
 20 See id. at 669. 
 21 Kreis, supra note 8, at 312. 
 22 Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 669. 
 23 See infra Part II.B. 
 24 See infra Part II.D.  
 25 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938). 
 26 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 101, 72 Stat. 731, 737–38 (1958). 
 27 ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR POLICY CHANGES 
ARE ENACTED 111 (Princeton Univ. Press 2008).  
 28 Id. at 112.  
 29 Id. at 111.  Trunk airline is the name given to commercial airlines certified to fly long-
haul service. Id.  
 30 John Robson, Airline Deregulation: Twenty Years of Success and Counting, REGULATION, 
Oct. 1998, at 17, 18. 
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B.  Deregulation: Unshackling the Airline Industry 
Faced with barriers from a non-responsive bureaucratic agency, CAB, 
and mounting foreign protectionism, the U.S. Congress passed—and 
President Jimmy Carter signed—the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.31  
The act made substantive revisions to the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and 
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 by reducing CAB’s control over interstate 
and foreign routes.  Specifically, CAB was disallowed from approving 
agreements that “limit[ed] the level of capacity among air carriers in markets 
in which they compete[d], that fixe[d] rates, fares, or charges between or 
among air carriers.”32  Additionally, it reemphasized that competition was 
paramount, prohibiting approval of agreements that would “reduce[ ] or 
elimintate[ ] competition.”33  Moreover, CAB was endowed with the 
authority to immunize carriers from antitrust violations.34  The law tried to 
reduce barriers carriers faced and “open the industry to competition and 
thereby increase economic efficiency and service.”35  
Deregulation was met with skepticism and outright opposition from 
existing carriers and labor unions.36  Without government protection, many 
financially vulnerable carriers feared deregulation would lead to their 
collapse.37  Indeed, deregulation had such an effect. Legacy carriers—
Braniff, Eastern, and TWA—were forced out of the market; whereas, small 
intrastate carriers expanded into the national market.38  By 1985, 
approximately 120 airlines went bankrupt or closed their doors.39  Surviving 
carriers were forced to “reinvent themselves.”40  Carriers began offering 
loyalty programs and computerized reservation systems to encourage 
consumer interest.41  They restructured routes along a hub-and-spoke system, 
allowing maximum flight capacity with linked ticket prices for those 
                                                                                                                   
 31 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, and 49 U.S.C.). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id.  
 34 Id. Though typically viewed as an anticompetitive practice, it was meant to allow further 
competition by allowing carriers to freely merge generating more efficient and cost-conscious 
moves.  The net result being a more competitive market.  
 35 Kreis, supra note 8, at 312. 
 36 PATASHNIK, supra note 27, at 113.  
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 115. 
 39 Charles G. Moerdler, Deregulation – The United States Experience, 6 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 
177, 183 (1989). 
 40 PATASHNIK, supra note 27, at 115.   
 41 Id.  
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routes.42  During deregulation, ticket fares dropped because legacy carriers 
were forced to compete with new market entrants offering simple operations 
with “ ‘no frills’ service.”43  
One of the biggest market effects was the cannibalization of smaller 
airlines by the larger carriers.  Prior to deregulation, mergers were scarcely 
used, except in situations where a carrier was declaring bankruptcy.44  In the 
years following deregulation, mergers were permitted for commercial and 
local carriers as well as the creation of marketing alliances.45  This 
consolidation of carriers and subsequent alliance structure has survived to the 
present day, including foreign carriers.  Consolidation was sanctioned by the 
government, granting de facto antitrust exemption for alliance compliance, in 
the name of economic efficiency.46  
Moreover, these bankruptcies and mergers had massive implications for 
labor relations.  The pre-deregulation regime afforded stability to the airline 
industry and organized labor, allowing carriers to afford high labor contracts 
by passing the costs on to the consumers through steady fare increases.47  
When deregulation finally set in, the industry’s stability was upset, which 
caused shockwaves for all stakeholders.48  The industry suffered “[m]assive 
lay offs [sic], significant reductions in salaries, two-tiered salary structures, 
unprecedented work rule changes, a plethora of labor disputes, and even 
‘union busting.’ ”49  No longer amicable negotiating partners, management 
and organized labor clashed as both tried to recover from the industry shock. 
Former collegiality was abandoned. Organized labor, like the Air Line 
Pilots Association (ALPA), instituted strikes to combat new reforms.50  For 
example, in 1985, ALPA conducted a twenty-nine-day strike against United 
Air Lines when the airline attempted to create a new tiered pay structure.51  
The structure would have paid new hires less than present airline 
employees.52  When the strike ended and employees went back to work, the 
damage had been done.  ALPA continued their active opposition when they 
tried to secure ownership in the corporation for greater leverage over 
                                                                                                                   
 42 Id. 
 43 Id.  
 44 Id. at 118. 
 45 Id. at 118–19. 
 46 See generally id. 
 47 See Moerdler, supra note 39, at 183. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 179. 
 50 Id. at 184. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
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management.53  This never completely materialized.54 This combative 
takeover approach was a radical move for a labor organization, which 
showed the heightened pressure on both sides. 
Concurrently, deregulation allowed some airlines to begin a process of 
“union busting.”  Many nonunion airlines thrived after deregulation while 
some unionized airlines used the industry financial crisis to cut out labor 
altogether.55  Frank Lorenzo, the man behind Texas Air Corp., gobbled up 
bankrupting carriers—Eastern, Continental, Peoples, and Frontier—merging 
them into Texas International.56  Through the bankruptcy process, he was 
able to eliminate collective bargaining agreements and reduce intensive labor 
costs, which allowed him to offer consistently lower prices.57  This policy of 
using bankruptcy to bust up unions was made possible by the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Railway Labor Act.  
Employees of the airline industry are governed by the Railway Labor Act 
(RLA).58  After 1978 the judiciary addressed substantive issues of distressed 
airlines and unions facing a potential loss of bargaining power.  Before 
deregulation airline operating costs had risen, accounting for a substantial 
portion of airline’s expenses.59  Deregulation dissolved CAB’s power fix 
prices, forcing airlines to offer competitive pricing.60  Competitive pricing 
and increased operating expenses that could not be passed along to 
consumers caused several air carriers to breakdown.61  Airlines tried to 
restructure collective bargaining agreements to avoid collapse.  Generally, 
labor unions opposed restructuring and would not compromise in order to 
reach an agreement, which forced the judiciary to take a more active role.62 
Courts were unwilling to force financially compromised air carriers to 
become beholden to labor demands at the cost of insolvency.  As 
                                                                                                                   
 53 COREY ROSEN, JOHN CASE & MARTIN STAUBUS, EQUITY: WHY EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP IS 
GOOD FOR BUSINESS (Harvard Bus. Sch. Press 2005). 
 54 In 1994 an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) was created, whereby employees 
surrendered approximately $4.8 billion in potential wages and benefits in exchange for 55% 
(ALPA held this stock alongside the International Association of Machinists and 
nonunionized workers) of United’s stock and the power to select three directors on the 
corporate board.  James P. Miller, United ESOP not Flying High, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 2, 2001).   
 55 Moerdler, supra note 39, at 180–81. 
 56 Id.  
 57 Id. at 183. 
 58 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (1996). A more detailed explanation of the RLA is included 
below. See infra Part II. 
 59 Moerdler, supra note 39, at 188. 
 60 Beth S. Adler, Deregulation in the Airline Industry: Toward a New Judicial Interpretation 
of the Railway Labor Act, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1003, 1015 (1986). 
 61 Id. at 1010. 
 62 Id. 
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bankruptcies surged, the courts were forced to adopt rules governing the 
abandonment of collective bargaining agreements.63  In cases of insolvency, 
courts permitted carriers to reject preexisting collective bargains.  
An alternative to bankruptcy was merger.  Courts handled mergers and 
other attempts at airline survival differently.  The court refrained from 
adjudicating those matters, deferring to the authority of the National 
Mediation Board (NMB) and adjustment boards to make decisions.64  
Regardless, the court was sympathetic to carriers on the brink of collapse; 
they would prevent labor agreements from stealing the company’s last gasp.  
Whereas, in cases involving financially sound airlines, the court consistently 
refused to intervene in labor disputes, deferring decisions to the RLA 
framework.65  
After the dust settled from deregulation, the airline industry normalized.  
The shock to the system had caused a massive industry consolidation and 
drove perennial carriers into insolvency.  Simultaneously, deregulation 
strained relations between management and organized labor, creating an 
uneasiness and skepticism that still permeates present negotiations between 
the parties.  In the years following, labor and management continued to 
struggle to reach compromises in the face of impending liberalization efforts.  
Many industry watchers fear that increased airline liberalization, like 
deregulation, will cause reductions in labor protections. 
                                                                                                                   
 63 In National Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), the U.S. 
Supreme Court unanimously held that a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding could reject a 
collective bargaining agreement, but the Court splintered over when the debtor could properly 
exercise that power. Id. at 1017–18.  While the decision explicitly excepted Parties covered by 
the RLA, labor unions that remained considered that the decision would be extended to them 
in due time. Id. at n.116. 
 64 In the post-deregulation period, the court regularly denied injunctive requests from labor 
organizations trying to impede mergers, self-help remedies, and other attempts to circumvent 
collective bargaining agreements.  Instead, the court continually reiterated that the proper 
authority to address the issues were those outlined in the RLA.  See id. at 1021–26; accord 
Ass’n of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO v. USAir, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1992) 
(denying injunctive relief to AFA after merger airlines rejected application of preexisting 
collective bargaining agreement pre-merger); Ass’n of Flight Attendants v. Republic Airlines, 
Inc., 534 F. Supp. 783 (D. Minn. 1982) (refusing to grant an injunction to the manager’s 
imposition of “self-help” remedies when negotiations stalled on a new post-merger collective 
bargaining agreement); Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Texas Int’l Airlines, 502 F. Supp. 423 
(E.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 656 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1981) (denying to grant an injunction, the 
District Court found that the NMD was the appropriate authority to determine union 
certification of the employees in the litigation).  
 65 Adler, supra note 60, at 1026–27. 
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C.  “Open Skies” Ahead 
Deregulation opened the U.S. domestic airline market, but it did not give 
air carriers increased access to international markets.  In the wake of 
Bermuda II, the United States signed several bilateral air transport 
agreements with European nations.66  The new wave of bilateral agreements 
was far more liberal, departing from the protectionist structure of Bermuda 
II.67  These agreements were the predecessors to the “open skies” agreements 
of the 1990s.68  In just five years, the United States had signed twenty-three 
new “liberal” bilateral agreements with foreign nations.69  
In 1992, the USDOT formally adopted an initiative for negotiating open 
skies agreements to increase the liberalization efforts created by the 
preexisting bilateral agreements.70  The USDOT solicited input from various 
stakeholders, including labor unions.71  From these responses, the department 
developed a comprehensive definition of open skies to inform future 
agreements.  That same year, the United States signed its first bilateral open 
skies agreement with the Netherlands.72  The deal represented a crucial step 
toward greater liberalization and forced other European nations to the 
negotiating table.  KLM, a Dutch ‘flagbearer’ carrier, immediately had a 
“competitive advantage” under the agreement because it had access to the 
entire U.S. market without any gateway restrictions.73  This competitive 
advantage had a domino effect; European nations became more willing to 
sign open skies agreements, which provided the U.S. carriers with “quasi-
                                                                                                                   
 66 In 1978, the U.S. entered three separate bilateral air transport agreements with Belgium, 
Netherlands, and Germany.  Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 670; Protocol Between the Government 
of the United States and the Government of Belgium Relating to Air Transport, U.S.-Belg., Dec. 
12–14, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 617; Protocol Relating to the United States of America – Netherlands 
Air Transport Agreement of 1957, U.S.-Neth., Mar. 31, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 3088; Protocol Relating 
to the United States of America – Federal Republic of Germany Air Transport Agreement of 
1955, U.S.-Ger., Nov. 1, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 7323.  
 67 Christian Hofer & Martin Dresner, The United States - European Union Open Aviation 
Area: The American Perspective, 46 J. TRANSP. RES. F. 129, 130 (2007), http://journals.Oreg 
ondigital.org/trforum/article/download/1001/896. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id.  
 70 Defining “Open Skies”; Order Requesting Comments, 57 Fed. Reg. 19323-01 (Aug. 5, 
1992). 
 71 Id.  
 72 Jacob A. Warden, “Open Skies” at a Crossroads: How the United States and European 
Union Should Use the ECJ Transport Cases to Reconstruct the Transatlantic Aviation 
Regime, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 227, 236 (2003).  
 73 Id. Gateway restrictions are limitations placed on foreign carriers to access certain 
locations. Id.   
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2018  1:56 PM 
2018] AVOIDING DEADSTICK 525 
 
cabotage”74 across Europe.75  In the years following, the United States 
negotiated a total of sixteen additional bilateral open skies agreements.76   
However, the European bilateral agreements conflicted with the “Single 
European Aviation market”77  Derived from the Single European Act of 1987 
(SEA), the model integrated all member states of the European Commission 
(EC or Commission) into a “common market.”78  Under the SEA, barriers to 
trade were lifted and voting mechanisms were restructured, making 
deregulation of the European internal aviation market possible.79  This 
resulted in the adoption of a string of reforms known as the “three 
packages.”80  While the first regulation had little effect, the second package 
granted carriers of Member States greater autonomy in setting fares and gave 
them third, fourth, and some fifth freedom rights.81  The third package 
brought even greater liberalization to the European market by removing any 
“remaining barriers to a free aviation market,” providing Member State 
carriers “full cabotage . . . within the collective European Union.”82  
When Member States continued to broker individual bilateral open skies 
agreements with the United States, the EC feared these agreements were 
detrimental to the larger European community.  Even the U.K. continued to 
negotiate separately with the United States, revising the Bermuda II 
agreement four additional times83 after its inception in order to adjust for 
airport growth, the exit of TWA and Pan Am from the market,84 and the 
advent of code-sharing85 programs.86  Finally, in 1998, the EC challenged 
                                                                                                                   
 74 Cabotage (also cabotage rights or privileges) is the permission from one country to a 
foreign entity, a state or carrier, to transport persons or items through destinations within the 
nation.  George Firican, The Chicago Conference Documents: Pamphlet on Freedom Rights 
and Cabotage, INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/Search/pages/results.aspx?k=c 
abotage (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).    
 75 Warden, supra note 72, at 236.  
 76 Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 673. 
 77 Single European Act (1987) created common market and common transport policies that 
allowed stringent regulations against member states and a deregulation of the EC internal 
market, including aviation. Id. 
 78 Warden, supra note 72, at 233. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 234. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Bermuda II was revised in 1981, 1991, 1995, and then again in 1997 to capture growing 
demands in air travel and changes on the U.S. carriers who could access Heathrow airport.  
Open Skies Agreement Highlights, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 30, 2009), https://2009-2017.sta 
te.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/2009/119760.htm. 
 84 Both TWA and Pan Am declared bankruptcy, with the latter being bought out by 
American Airlines.  PATASHNIK, supra note 27. 
 85 Code sharing is a system by which two or more airlines share a flight number and will 
advertise it under both carriers. Id. 
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these bilateral open skies agreements in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
as being inherently discriminatory.87  The EC filed actions against seven 
Member States: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, 
Germany, and the U.K.88  The EC argued that the agreements brokered 
between these nations and the United States infringed on (1) “the external 
competence of the Community” and (2) “the provisions of the [EC] Treaty 
concerning the right of establishment.”89  The ECJ found that in all the cases, 
except that involving the U.K. who had a preexisting agreement, the Member 
States were not permitted to enter into a commitment that has already been 
determined to be within the discretion of the community.90  Additionally, the 
court found the United States’ express refusal rights (for permit grants to 
carriers that do not have “substantial ownership” and “effective control” by 
the contracting nation) was discriminatory to carriers owned and operated by 
Member States in the contracting country.91  
In their ruling, the ECJ effectively invalidated the agreements of these 
nations.  With the rejection of the agreements, a new agreement had to be 
struck between the United States and the entire EU.92  The new deal would 
replace preexisting bilateral open skies agreements.  The EC would then be 
able to promote the overall community’s goals, remove possible 
discrimination among EU carriers, and ensure the proper exchange of 
information.93  This mandate for negotiations between the United States and 
the EU became the groundwork for the next stage of open skies 
agreements—the U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement. 
                                                                                                                   
 86 See BRIAN F. HAVEL, BEYOND OPEN SKIES: A NEW REGIME FOR INTERNATIONAL 
AVIATION 309 (Wolters Kluwer 2009). 
 87 Cumulatively the “Open Skies Judgment”: Case C-466/98, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 
2002 E.C.R. I-09427; Case C-467/98, Comm’n v. Denmark, 2002 E.C.R. I-09519; Case C-
468/98, Comm’n v. Sweden, 2002 E.C.R. I-09575; Case C-469/98, Comm’n v. Finland, 2002 
E.C.R. I-09627; Case C-471/98, Comm’n v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I-09681; Case C-472/98, 
Comm’n v. Luxembourg, 2002 E.C.R. I-09741; Case C-475/98, Comm’n v. Austria, 2002 
E.C.R. I-09797; Case C-476/98, Comm’n v. Germany, 2002 E.C.R. I-09855 [hereinafter Open 
Skies Judgment]. 
 88 European Commission Press Release No. 89/02, The Court of Justice Explains, By These 
Judgments, The Distribution of Competence as Regards the Conclusion of International Air 
Transport Agreements (Nov. 5, 2002).     
 89 Id. 
 90 Id.   
 91 Open Skies Judgment, supra note 87.  
 92 European Commission Press Release IP/03/281, Open Skies: Commission sets out its 
international air transport policy (Feb. 26, 2003).  Bermuda II remained operational but was 
soon replaced by the ATA. 
 93 Id. 
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D.  U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement 
From the remnants of the fractured bilateral agreements, the United States 
and EU sought to craft a new compromise that would incorporate the entirety 
of the European community.  On April 30, 2007, the U.S.-EU Air Transport 
Agreement (ATA) was ratified and became effective a year later.94  The 
negotiations began five years prior to completion.  Initially, the U.S. 
Congress opposed early drafts of the agreement, citing concerns over 
ownership control, labor, and aviation security.95  From the European 
perspective, “[t]he desire . . . to have ownership and control rights in the 
United States, and the U.S. government’s inability to grant that access, 
delayed and nearly derailed a final accord.”96  Despite this impasse, the 2007 
Agreement was eventually passed, but it left many issues unresolved.  
1.  2007 Agreement: First Stage Negotiations 
Notwithstanding the remaining issues, the 2007 Agreement was 
groundbreaking in scope and effect.  The Agreement finally recognized a 
single European market.97  EU member nations’ carriers were considered 
“Community Airlines” who could freely fly to any city in the United States. 
Likewise, U.S. carriers were able to fly to and from any city in the EU and 
every city in the United States, including EU inauguration flights with 
intermediate destinations in the EU before ending in the United States.98  
Furthermore, the agreement allowed: prices to be established freely;99 
frequency and capacity of flights to adjust with the market;100 sales and 
operation offices to be established in the other Party’s territories;101 computer 
reservation systems (CRS) to be shared among carriers;102 and competitive 
agreements to be established between carriers without fear of losing 
routes.103  
                                                                                                                   
 94 Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-EU, Apr. 30, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 470 [hereinafter 2007 
Agreement]. A copy of the U.S.-EU Agreement, along with other significant documents 
concerning negotiations, is available at https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ata/e/eu/114768. 
htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2017). 
 95 Christian Westra, The April 2007 U.S.-EU “Open Skies” Agreement: A Dream of 
Liberalization Deferred, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 161, 170–71 (2009). 
 96 Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 676.  
 97 Id.  
 98 2007 Agreement, supra note 94, art. 3(1)–(2). 
 99 Id. art. 13. 
 100 Id. art. 3(4). 
 101 Id. art. 10. 
 102 Id. art. 17. 
 103 Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 677. 
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On the other hand, two important issues remained unsolved from the 2007 
Agreement: cabotage rights and carrier ownership rights.  First, the United 
States was given authority to fly between European cities en route to and 
from a U.S. city, but EU nations were not able to equally fly between U.S. 
cities.104  This meant that EU carriers were still reliant on the alliance 
structure to generate multi-city flights passing through the United States. 
Second, substantial ownership and control rights of U.S. carriers were still 
denied to EU member states and nationals.105  Pursuant to the 2007 
Agreement, Annex 4, foreign ownership of equity in a U.S. carrier was 
limited to no more than twenty-five percent of a corporation’s voting 
shares.106  Additionally, “actual control” of any U.S. carrier was strictly 
prohibited for foreigners.107  The Agreement even went so far as to state that 
neither 25% of the voting equity nor 49.9% of the total equity was sufficient 
to be deemed control of a U.S. carrier.108  Due to these restrictions, the EU 
similarly placed limitations on the amount of ownership and control U.S. 
nationals could exert on community carriers.109  
The concern over reducing foreign ownership restrictions is a concern 
largely pushed by U.S. labor organizations.  These organizations fear 
increased foreign ownership will lead to U.S. labor being replaced with 
“cheap, unqualified labor from third countries.”110  In response, liberalization 
proponents argue that allowing increased foreign ownership will increase 
investment in U.S. airlines and open foreign markets to allow the carriers to 
become more competitive worldwide, preventing job loss.111  Due to these 
growing concerns from U.S. and European labor organizations, two aviation 
forums on liberalization and labor were held before second stage 
negotiations could begin.112  
The European Commission held the first labor forum on liberalization and 
labor in Washington, D.C. in 2008 to discuss the 2007 Agreement and 
address its “social effects.”113  The forum included airline labor organization 
representatives, U.S. and EU officials, academics, arbitrators, and legal 
                                                                                                                   
 104 2007 Agreement, supra note 94, art. 3. 
 105 Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 678. 
 106 2007 Agreement, supra note 94, at Annex 4, art. 1. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 711.  
 111 Id. at 711–12. 
 112 Id. at 713. 
 113 European Cockpit Association, First Trans-Atlantic Aviation Labour Forum, https:// 
www.eurocockpit.be/stories/20081211/first-trans-atlantic-aviation-labour-forum (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2017).  
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experts.114  The opening remarks outlined the present struggle to 
simultaneously understand the ramifications of the 2007 Agreement on labor 
while generating appropriate protections in the upcoming second stage 
negotiations.115  The forum focused on unresolved labor issues associated 
with the 2007 Agreement: flooding of cheap labor into higher-priced 
markets, growth of “flags of convenience,”116 loss in market share, extensive 
industry consolidation, and increased labor forum shopping.117  These issues 
remained unaddressed, prompting the parties to meet again less than a year 
later in the second labor forum.  
In June 2009, organized labor organizations from the United States and 
Europe came together again with policy makers and other stakeholders to 
further develop solutions for the protection of airline industry employees 
with increased liberalization under the forthcoming second stage of the U.S.-
EU Open Skies agreement.118  A keynote speaker from the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) explained that international employee 
representation is a “core challenge” that presently lacks a uniform standard 
for proper enforcement mechanisms.119  In addressing this critical issue, the 
forum put forth several approaches: trans-national agreements with trans-
national companies, European works councils, multinational conventions, 
common labor standards across companies’ operations in multinational 
jurisdictions, and the convergence of labor laws of the treaty parties.120  
                                                                                                                   
 114 John Bruton, Ambassador, Head of Delegation of the European Commission in 
Washington, Opening Speech to the Labour Forum (Dec. 3, 2008). 
 115 Id.  
 116 Originally applied to the maritime industry, “Flags of Convenience” is a term coined by 
the International Transport Workers’ Federation that denotes an air carrier that registers itself 
and its aircrafts (“plants its flag”) in a different nation to capture a more advantageous law.   
Flags of Convenience, INT’L TRANSP. WORKERS’ FEDERATION, http://www.itfglobal.org/en/tra 
nsport-sectors/civil-aviation/in-focus/focs-in-aviation/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2017).  Generally, 
the carrier will have reduced fees and taxes and can sometimes enjoy laxer labor standards 
than what might exist in its natural home country. Id. 
 117 Douglas Lavin, Reg’l Vice Pres. N. Am. IATA, The Need for Change, EU-US Aviation 
Forum on Liberalisation and Labour: Past, Present and Future (Dec. 4, 2008), summary 
available at https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/modes/air/events/doc/douglas_ 
lavin_iata.pdf 
 118 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU-U.S. SECOND AVIATION FORUM ON LIBERALISATION AND 
LABOUR: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (June 22–23 2009), https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transp 
ort/files/modes/air/events/doc/2009_06_22_executive_summary.pdf [hereinafter SECOND 
AVIATION FORUM]. 
 119 Id. at 2.  
 120 Id. at 3–6.  
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The first approach, voluntary trans-national agreements, like international 
framework agreements121 and European Framework Agreements, allow 
trans-national companies to make independent contracts with employees 
without relying on national governments.122  Airlines KLM and EasyJet have 
both used these in the past.  The former used an agreement to maintain 
preexisting labor arrangements when they merged with Air France; the latter 
relied on these agreements to create jurisdiction-specific agreements to 
accommodate local labor conditions.123   However, these agreements are 
limited in their use because they lack a formal enforcement mechanism that 
is accepted globally.124  
The second recommended approach was to expand the present use of 
European Works Councils (EWCs) even further.125  While the EWCs cannot 
substitute for formal union and management negotiations platforms, these 
employee bodies allow a clear dialogue, so employees are kept informed of 
formal negotiations procedures.126  They are particularly helpful when used 
alongside other approaches like the aforementioned trans-national 
agreements.127  
Next, a multinational convention was recommended to solve the concern 
over international labor representation.  Like the Chicago Convention, 
nations could agree to certain standards for the regulation of airline workers 
across the board.  During the forum, commentators primarily relied on the 
Maritime Labour Convention as an exemplar to be followed.128  Under a 
similar convention, minimum standards for employment conditions, health 
and safety protections, wages and hours, and various other issues could be 
established.129  Yet, creation of a convention would require the ILO to begin 
extensive debates, spanning several years, and would require a two-thirds 
vote from the members to establish, making it an unlikely approach.130    
                                                                                                                   
 121 International framework agreements (IFAs) are bargains struck between a multinational 
enterprise and a Global Union Federation (GUF), establishing the same standards for how the 
company will conduct itself in all the countries it operates.  Dominique Michel, International 
Framework Agreements: A Global Tool for Supporting Rights at Work, INT’L LABOUR ORG. 
(Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_080723/lan 
g--en/index.htm.  
 122 SECOND AVIATION FORUM, supra note 118, at 3. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id.  
 125 Id. at 4.  
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 4–5. 
 129 Id. at 5. 
 130 Id. at 2.  
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The last two approaches looked generally at how common labor standards 
could be generated or present standards converged into a universally binding 
set of rules.131  Like trans-national agreements, the common labor standards 
approach creates uniform standards within a single company regardless of 
the jurisdiction in which it’s operating.132  Nations can create this uniformity 
through declarations, treaties, or trans-national agreements; whereas, a 
convergence of laws binds companies carrying the flags of the participating 
nations.133  
Most of the focus in the forum was on the forthcoming second stage 
negotiations.134  The concern was whether the agreement could be amended 
to include a “recognition of existing arrangements,” while simultaneously 
providing protection for the four fundamental labor rights—the ability to 
organize, negotiate, agree, and enforce collectively—under a clear 
negotiations framework.135  A single European labor law, akin to the U.S. 
Railway Labor Act,136 would be the best framework for ensuring these 
fundamentals, according to ALPA representatives.137  If this was possible, 
then progress might be viable in creating a substantive protection for 
employee representation. 
Like foreign ownership rights and extended cabotage, these issues were 
left unresolved, but the parties agreed to return to them during “second stage 
negotiations.”138  The parties followed up these labor forums and began 
working on the second stage negotiations almost immediately.139  Ultimately, 
the 2010 Agreement failed to include any decisive protection for the 
fundamental labor rights laid out during the Labor Forum, and the 
Agreement did not create any new framework for controlling labor 
representation abroad.140  The Agreement, however, did create social 
protections never before included in any air transport agreement, including 
Article 17 bis labor protections.141  
                                                                                                                   
 131 Id. at 5. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 5–6. 
 135 Id. at 6. 
 136 See infra Part II.  
 137 Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 716.  
 138 2007 Agreement, supra note 94, art. 21.  In fact, under the provisions of the agreement 
future negotiations were required to begin within eighteen months and conclude a second 
stage agreement within twelve months from then; otherwise, either Party could unilaterally 
suspend the rights conferred in the agreement. Id. 
 139 Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 680. 
 140 Id. at 717–18. 
 141 Id. at 718.  
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2.  2010 Agreement: Second Stage Negotiations 
The 2007 Agreement went into effect on March 30, 2008.142  The 
agreement was met with warm reception.  Jacques Barrot, Vice-President of 
the European Commission of Transports, stated, “[t]his marks the start of a 
new era in transatlantic aviation.  This agreement will bring more 
competition and cheaper flights to the US.”143  Despite this reception, the 
parties remained resolved to further liberalize the transatlantic airline 
markets.  The United States wanted to continue to create competitive 
structures for U.S. carriers; whereas, the EU continued to advance their 
objective of creating a “transatlantic Open Aviation Area.”144  By 2010, the 
parties sought to make strides in these areas in passing the second stage 
agreement (2010 Agreement).  
On June 24, 2010, the 2010 Agreement was provisionally put into 
effect.145  Using the foundation of the 2007 Agreement, the revisions created 
more opportunities for investment and access to the airline market.146  In 
approving the 2010 Agreement, the parties made the ATA permanent.  
Additionally, the 2010 Agreement made substantive revisions for 
cooperating on safety, security, the environment, and labor.147  The last of 
these measures, labor, was captured as the “social dimension” of the 
agreement in Article 17:  
1.  The Parties recognise the importance of the social 
dimension of the Agreement and the benefits that arise 
when open markets are accompanied by high labour 
standards.  The opportunities created by the Agreement 
are not intended to undermine labour standards or the 
labour-related rights and principles contained in the 
Parties’ respective laws. 
2.  The principles in paragraph 1 shall guide the Parties as 
they implement the Agreement, including regular 
consideration by the Joint Committee, pursuant to 
                                                                                                                   
 142 European Commission Press Release IP/08/474, EU-US Open Skies: A New Era in 
Transatlantic Aviation Starts on 30 March (Mar. 28, 2008). 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. The transatlantic Open Aviation Area is understood to mean “a single air transport 
market between the EU and the US with free flows of investment and no restrictions on air 
services, including access to the domestic markets of both parties.” Id.  
 145 International Aviation: United States, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/transp 
ort/modes/air/international_aviation/country_index/united_states_en.htm.  
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
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Article 18, of the social effects of the Agreement and 
the development of appropriate responses to concerns 
found to be legitimate.148 
This provision represented a “historic breakthrough” because of its “explicit 
commitment to high labor standards,” and the obligations it placed on parties 
to not intentionally undermine labor standards, which had never been 
previously done.149  
The 2010 Agreement made large strides in the continued liberalization of 
the airline market.  However, the same issues that remained unaddressed 
after the 2007 Agreement were still left open again: U.S. restrictions on 
foreign ownership and control rights and EU rights to fly between the United 
States and non-EU nations.150  These considerations were largely left up to 
the parties to address through the Joint Committee.  Therefore, the 
commitment to a “shared goal of continuing to remove market barriers to 
maximize benefits for consumers, airlines, labour, and communities” would 
have to be realized through the subsequent interpretation of Article 17 bis.151  
Such an opportunity arose when the USDOT rescinded its initial approval of 
NAI’s foreign carrier permit.  
III.  LABOR STANDARDS OF THE ATA SIGNATORIES 
Under Article 17 bis of the ATA, both parties are obligated to not 
intentionally undermine “labour standards or the labour-related rights and 
principles contained in the Parties’ respective laws.”152  To understand the 
breadth of Article 17 bis, the standards, rights, and principles of the Parties’ 
laws must be ascertained.  There are substantive similarities among the 
parties’ labor standards, including rights for collective bargaining.  
Procedurally the parties create and enforce labor standards very differently.  
One critical difference between the parties is the clarity of labor principals as 
they pertain to relations among employers and employees.  
                                                                                                                   
 148 Memorandum of Consultations on a Protocol to Amend the Air Transp. Agreement 
Between the U.S. and the European Cmty. and Its Member States (Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter 
2010 Agreement], http:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/139411.pdf. 
 149 Hunnicutt, supra note 7, at 681. 
 150 Id. at 682. 
 151 European Commission Press Release IP/03/281, supra note 92. 
 152 2010 Agreement, supra note 148.  
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A.  U.S. Controlling Law: Railway Labor Act  
The paramount law governing labor standards—specifically collective 
bargaining—for U.S. air carriers is the RLA.153  Originally passed in 1926 to 
address national railways, the RLA was extended to cover the emerging 
airline industry in 1936.154  Like the nation’s railroads, the airline industry 
represented a delicate market that needed room to grow without harsh 
regulatory barriers, while simultaneously supporting massive numbers of 
workers with unique and demanding working hours and conditions.155  
Hence, the aim of the RLA is to “promote collective bargaining and to 
prevent major slowdowns in [the airline industry] integral to the smooth 
functioning of national commerce.”156  The NMB was created to minimize 
industry-wide slowdowns that might cripple the national economy.157  
Under the RLA, the NMB handles clashes between labor organizations 
and employers.158  Typically, the Board acts as an arbitrator settling “minor” 
disputes, while acting in a “non-binding mediation role in major [ ] 
disputes.”159  Courts generally defer to the NMD on minor disputes, making 
the Board’s authority in these cases essentially compulsory.160  Whereas, the 
Board’s role in major disputes—when negotiations stall between labor 
organizations and management and there is a potential for strike—is to 
mediate between the parties.161  If the parties cannot reach a resolution after 
the required cooling period, then both parties can take appropriate measures, 
including employees striking and management locking-out employees or 
imposing new rules.162  However, where a strike might cause costly 
deprivations of necessary services, an emergency ad hoc board can be 
appointed to investigate and make recommendations to the President, during 
                                                                                                                   
 153 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (1982).  
 154 Adler, supra note 60, at 1005.  
 155 Lawrence J. Kelly, Is that “Whoosh” You Hear a New Whispher-Jet Whisking Across 
U.S. Skies, or the Perotvian “Sucking-Sound” of Jobs Leaving the Country?, 14 LAW & BUS. 
REV. AM. 699, 708 (2008).  
 156 Adler, supra note 60, at 1005. 
 157 Kelly, supra note 155. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. Under the RLA “minor disputes” involve “interpretation or application of an existing 
agreement.” Adler, supra note 60, at 1008.  Whereas, “major disputes” concern negotiating 
new or amending existing collective bargain agreements. Id. at 1005.  Neither of these terms 
are explicitly stated in the RLA statutory language; however, the U.S. Supreme Court, 
interpreting the RLA in Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), relied on these 
distinctions in defining the scope of the Board’s authority. Id. at n.20.    
 160 Kelly, supra note 155, at 708. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
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which time the parties must maintain the status quo.163  If after all this the 
parties cannot reach a satisfactory resolution, then the President or Congress 
may be able to intervene to direct the “outcome of the impasse.”164  
B.  European Union Labor Law 
Like the United States, individual EU nations (with one exception165) 
maintain their own labor laws codified in various statutes.  As members of 
the EU, each nation must meet certain minimum standards under the Treaty 
on the EU.166  The Treaty allows the EU’s minimum standards to be adopted 
through “directives,” and individual member states can enhance these labor 
provisions as they deem fit.167  Once directives have been incorporated in the 
national laws of the member states, national courts are obligated to “interpret 
law as consistent with European law,” considering both the law’s wording 
and purpose.168  The European Commission ensures these directives are 
incorporated into the member states’ national laws, and they continuously 
monitor the implementation of these rules.169  If a country is deemed to have 
“lacking or incorrect implementation of regulations,” then the Commission 
may seek redress in the ECJ.170  
The directives promulgated by the Commission have generally focused 
on creating minimum standards in a few critical areas.  The Commission’s 
directives typically aim to preserve freedom of contract, minimum standards 
for employee protections and working conditions, equal treatment and non-
discrimination policies, and free collective bargaining and collective 
action.171  Standards of minimum wage, however, are generally held to be 
within the purview of collective bargain agreements between employee 
unions and management.172  These standards seek to “promote social 
                                                                                                                   
 163 Id. at 709. 
 164 Id. 
 165 France contains a unified Code of Labor Law.  Manfred Löwisch, Labor Law in Europe, 
20 RITSUMEIKAN L. REV. 102 (2003). 
 166 The Treaty on European Union, commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty, did not 
explicitly create any new labor standards; however, it did recognize existing European 
Community law from the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and the 
Single European Act.  Id.  Additional revisions to the Maastricht Treaty added more relevant 
labor standards. See Amsterdam Treaty, Nice Treaty, and Lisbon Treaty.  
 167 Labour Law, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=157 (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2017). 
 168 Löwisch, supra note 165, at 104. 
 169 Labour Law, supra note 167. 
 170 Löwisch, supra note 165, at 103. 
 171 Id. at 104–05.  
 172 Id. at 105. 
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progress and improve the living and working conditions of the people of 
Europe,”173 while preserving some national autonomy.  Unlike the United 
States, this belief permeates throughout EU labor law at all levels. 
Furthermore, EU member states have adopted certain labor standards by 
multilateral agreements or as required for membership in certain 
organizations.  For example, under the ILO, which all EU members have 
ratified, employees’ right to collectively bargain is recognized and 
incorporated into those nations’ domestic laws.174  Additionally, in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights Member States recognize employees’ rights 
to freely associate and workers’ rights to be informed and consult one 
another in that association.175  Lastly, the EU Charter itself creates a strong 
recognition on the necessity for social dialogue under Article 138.176  These 
various authorities have created both an internal and community-wide set of 
labor standards that Member States generally recognize and are expected to 
adhere to when negotiating with labor.  
C.  Preemption of Treaties and Other Joint Measures Affecting Labor 
Standards 
In addition to the labor laws of the United States and the EU, there are 
other bodies that provide a general framework for labor relations in the 
airline industry.  The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) allows nations around the globe to collaborate on 
standards for business conduct worldwide.177  The goal of the OECD is not 
singular advancement of labor above all other interests; instead, it strives for 
the “highest sustainable economic growth and employment” to contribute to 
the world economy at large.178  
OECD establishes guidelines for conducting labor relations and proper 
employment practices.179  Like most national laws, the guidelines 
recommend recognition of employees’ rights to collectively bargain and 
                                                                                                                   
 173 Labour Law, supra note 167. 
 174 See ILO, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, ILO Convention No. 
98 (July 1, 1949), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12 
100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312243:NO. 
 175 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 27, 2012 O.J. C 326/02, at 
401; id. art. 28. 
 176 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union art. 138, 
May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47.  
 177 Kelly, supra note 155, at 713. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. at 713–14. 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2018  1:56 PM 
2018] AVOIDING DEADSTICK 537 
 
unionize.180  More importantly though, the guidelines spell out that 
employers should employ standards that are “not less favourable [sic] than 
those observed by comparable employers in the host country.”181  While 
these guidelines are helpful to its member nations, they are limited in value.  
OECD guidelines cannot supersede a nation’s duly enacted labor or 
employment laws nor does the OECD possess an enforcement body to check 
whether the policies are being properly administered.182  Instead, OECD can 
rely on nothing more than moral suasion.  While the OECD does not have 
any enforcement power, Article 17 bis empowers nations to implement the 
ATA in accordance with those labor laws and principals, including OECD 
guidelines ascribed to by the signatory nations.  
IV.  ARTICLE 17 BIS PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION  
Under Article 17 bis, the parties must not implement the ATA in such a 
way that would undermine labor standards or the other parties’ labor laws.183  
The language of Article 17 bis has been arguably unclear about the 
provision’s scope of obligation and effect on the remainder of the 
Agreement, which raises three separate issues.  The first issue is whether 
Article 17 bis imposes a legal obligation on parties to consider one another’s 
labor standards, rights, and principles while carrying out their duties under 
the Agreement.  Second, assuming that obligation exists, does it extend to the 
authorization of foreign air carrier permits under Article 4?  For instance, 
would authorization of a carrier permit to an airline violating a Party’s labor 
standards, rights, or principles be tantamount to intentionally implementing 
the agreement to undermine those standards (thereby violating Article 17 bis 
proscriptions)?  Finally, if the first two are answered affirmatively, then the 
issue is whether the USDOT’s authorization of NAI’s foreign carrier permit 
was a violation of Articles 4 and 17 bis, considering their external hiring 
practices.  
A.  The Plain Meaning of the Text of Article 17 bis Creates a Legal 
Obligation 
Article 17 bis is more than a hortatory recognition of the value of high 
labor standards.  Instead, it imposes an obligation on all parties to the 
Agreement to carry out their duties without intentionally undermining one 
                                                                                                                   
 180 Id. at 713. 
 181 Id. at 714. 
 182 Id. at 713. 
 183 2010 Agreement, supra note 148.   
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another’s preexisting labor standards, rights, and principles.  Under the plain 
meaning of Article 17 bis, the text in paragraph one establishes the labor 
principles both parties recognize; whereas, the second paragraph imposes 
obligations on the parties.  The provision’s two paragraphs must be read in 
harmony as a single directive that binds all signatories to the Agreement.  
That directive is a legal obligation on all parties to carry out their duties 
under the ATA without intentionally undermining preexisting labor 
standards.  This construction is buttressed with the parties’ clear statements 
of intention and purpose, the surrounding negotiations, and the positive 
policy rationales.  
An interpretation of a treaty “begins with its text.”184  Words are to be 
given their plain and ordinary meaning, unless the treaty text provides a clear 
definition or the drafter’s contrary intent is shown.185  The context of the 
words may provide additional meaning to the terms.186  Treaties should be 
liberally construed and not limited to constrained meanings.187  If the text 
remains ambiguous despite the language’s clear meaning, then the parties 
may look outside the four corners of the document, including previous drafts 
of the provision, negotiation history, and the construction adopted by the 
parties.188  Moreover, it may be necessary to consider the entire context of 
                                                                                                                   
 184 Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 10 (2010) (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the 
interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.” (quoting Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 
(2008))); accord Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 325(1) (AM. LAW INST. 
1987) (“An international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”).    
 185 Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) (“The clear import of 
treaty language controls unless ‘application of the words of the treaty according to their 
obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its 
signatories.’ ” (quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963))).  
 186 Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534–35 (1991) (“When interpreting a 
treaty, [this Court begins] ‘with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written 
words are used.’ ” (quoting Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 
699 (1988))). 
 187 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985) (“[T]reaties are construed more liberally 
than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written 
words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by 
the parties.” (citing Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431–32 
(1943))). 
 188 Id.; Zicherman v. Korean Airlines, 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) (“[W]e have traditionally 
considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiating and drafting history (travaux 
préparatoires) and the postratification understanding of the contracting parties.”).      
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the agreement when construing the language to properly effectuate the 
overall purpose of the agreement.189 
The plain meaning of the Article 17 bis text must be ascertained by 
reading the two paragraphs in context. In the first sentence of paragraph one 
of Article 17 bis, the drafters explicitly recognize the complementary value 
of high labor standards with opening markets.190  In the second sentence, the 
drafters elaborate on this correlation: the opportunities produced from the 
airline industry liberalization are “not intended to undermine labour 
standards or the labour-related rights and principles contained in the Parties’ 
respective laws.”191  Read alone, paragraph one neither creates nor imposes 
any obligation on the parties whatsoever.  At most, paragraph one appears to 
state plainly the parties’ intentions and purposes.  However, paragraph one 
cannot be read in isolation.  
Under traditional maxims of treaty construction, the entire provision 
should be read together to derive its meaning.192  In fact, paragraph two 
directly references the principles stated in paragraph one.193  The second 
paragraph’s meaning is, therefore, inherently tied to the first paragraph’s 
text.  The plain text of the second paragraph states, “The principles in 
paragraph [one] shall guide the Parties as they implement the Agreement.”194  
There is no clear definition of the “principles” in paragraph one, which are to 
animate the parties’ actions.  Similarly, it is unclear how these “principles” 
specifically affect the practices of the parties as they implement the ATA.  
While “shall” generally has a legal definition, there is no express definition 
for either “guide” or “implement” in the Agreement.  However, the meaning 
of this sentence is clarified when it is read within the context of Article 17 
bis and the ATA as a whole.  
The “principles” encapsulated in paragraph one refer to the breadth of 
preexisting labor standards, rights, and principles of the signatories.  In the 
first instance, the statement is vague about which “principles” in paragraph 
one it denotes.  There are at least three possible options.  The most tangible 
meaning would be the express “labour standards or the labour-related rights 
and principles contained in the Parties’ respective laws.”195  In other words, 
                                                                                                                   
 189 Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States, 512 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“[W]e must ‘examine not only the language, but the entire context of agreement.’ ” (quoting 
Great-West Life Assur. Co. v. United States, 678 F.2d 180, 183 (1982))). 
 190 2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 4. 
 191 Id. 
 192 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 666 (1992) (deriving meaning of an 
article for extradition enforcement from the surrounding articles language and meaning). 
 193 2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 4. 
 194 Id. (emphasis added). 
 195 Id. 
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principles include those standards that have been codified into positive law 
by any of the parties.  Whereas, the more abstract view might be that 
“principles” refer to high labor standards in general.  A third and final view 
might assume that “principles” means the conjunction of high labor 
standards and open markets stated in the opening sentence of the provision.  
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “principle” can be defined as 
“[a] fundamental truth or proposition on which others depend”; “a general 
statement or tenet forming the (or a) basis of a system of belief”; or “[a] 
primary assumption forming the basis of a chain of reasoning.”196  Either of 
these three views could conform to the plain meaning of principles under at 
least one of these three definitions, so the ambiguity remains. 
Nevertheless, this ambiguity can be easily reconciled.  The two sentences 
of paragraph one parallel one another.  The drafters make a clear statement 
of intention in the first sentence, recognizing the conjunction of “open 
markets” and “high labor standards.”197  The second sentence makes a 
similar dichotomy between “opportunities” (a byproduct of open markets) 
and the parties’ preexisting labor standards and labor-related rights and 
principles.198  The parallel structure indicates that the parties believe their 
preexisting standards and laws are “high labor standards.”  So, a Party can 
uphold high labor standards by complying with one another’s preexisting 
labor laws.  Assuming “principles” refer to only the Parties’ preexisting labor 
laws provides a tangible basis for evaluating compliance.  Assessing the 
more abstract view, labor standards would equally require a barometer for 
compliance, which would be assessed under the Parties’ preexisting labor 
laws anyway.  Finally, the third interpretation cannot properly be denoted a 
principle since it merely describes the relative benefits of a relationship 
rather than a foundation of belief like a law provides.  Hence, “principles” in 
paragraph two refers to the whole body of preexisting labor standards, rights, 
and principles of the signatory nations.   
Turning to the next issue, the word “shall” has traditionally been 
understood to impose a duty on a Party.199  Like a contract, a treaty may 
impose obligations, binding each nation to the treaty.200  “Shall” can in some 
contexts obfuscate the meaning of whether a duty is discretionary or 
                                                                                                                   
 196 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2017). 
 197 2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 4. 
 198 Id. 
 199 BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 939–41 (2d ed. Oxford U. 
Press 1995).   
 200 BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1208 (2014) (“As a general 
matter, a treaty is a contract, though between nations.”).  
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mandatory;201 however, the meaning here must be deemed mandatory 
because of the context in which it is used.  The first paragraph one explicitly 
states that the Parties’ intention is to not actively undermine labor standards, 
rights, and principles encapsulated in the Parties’ laws.202  When read 
together with paragraph two, the second paragraph’s meaning becomes 
clearer.  Treating the language as discretionary would make the provision, at 
a minimum, devoid of effect—an interpretation that should be avoided.203  
Under a traditional canon of treaty construction, the text should be construed 
to avoid making provisions meaningless or superfluous.204  At worst, such an 
interpretation would produce absurd results.  If the Parties were permitted to 
intentionally undermine the labor laws of the other nations, then the Parties 
are permitted to act contrary to the clear statement of their own intention.  
This interpretation would hollow out the whole spirit of the Agreement and 
make Article 17 bis useless.  The plain meaning of “shall” must be construed 
as mandatory to avoid such irrational results. 
Unlike “shall,” there is no clear legal meaning for “guide” or 
“implement.”  “Guide” is defined as “to direct the course of [an instrument 
or action]”; “[t]o lead or direct in a course of action, in formation of 
opinions . . .”; or “to determine the course or direct of [events].”205  
“Implement” means “[t]o complete, perform, carry into effect [an 
agreement]” or “to fulfill (an engagement or promise).”206  Considering these 
definitions, paragraph two states that the principles in paragraph one 
(preexisting labor standards, rights, and principles) must direct or lead the 
behavior of the Parties as they perform or complete the Agreement. This 
interpretation necessarily raises two possible results: the provision is either 
an obligatory directive or a passive influencer.  Depending on which result 
controls, the provision may create an uncertain level of obligation on the 
Parties.  The remaining language of the provision clarifies this ambiguity. 
The context surrounding the inclusion of Article 17 bis shows the 
drafter’s intention and purpose was to create an obligatory directive not to 
intentionally undermine the Parties’ labor standards.  The explicit language 
                                                                                                                   
 201 The term has generally fallen out of favor in many legal circles, being replaced by words 
like “must” or “may,” as appropriate.  See REGISTER DOCUMENT DRAFTING HANDBOOK, 
OFFICE OF THE FED. REG., NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., FEDERAL, at iii (Oct. 1998) 
(“[W]e use ‘must’ instead of ‘shall’ because ‘must’ imposes a legal obligation.”).  
 202 2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 4.  
 203 Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2008) (“We have said, however, 
that [t]reaties, like statutes, should be construed so that no words are treated as being 
meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 204 Id. 
 205 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 196.  
 206 Id. 
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of paragraph one recognizes the benefit of high labor standards, stating “The 
opportunities created by the Agreement are not intended to undermine labour 
standards or the labour‐related rights and principles contained in the Parties’ 
respective laws.”207  This statement clearly confirms the purpose of Article 
17 bis was to ensure that neither Party would intentionally act to undermine 
labor standards.  While the word choice seems to permit unintentional 
undermining of labor standards, the overall language shows a definitive 
purpose to try and control intentional Party acts.  Besides, where a Party 
ratifies an international agreement, it is demonstrating formal consent to be 
bound by the language of the document.208  Thus, by ratifying the Agreement 
language, the Parties are presumed to approve and consent to being bound by 
said intention.  Moreover, a Party intentionally undermining a co-Party’s 
labor standards would rebuke the very explicit statement of intention 
ascribed by both Parties in paragraph one,209 which if permitted yields an 
illogical outcome.  Under the plain meaning of the text and surrounding 
context, Parties to the ATA have an affirmative duty to implement the 
agreement without intentionally undermining labor standards, rights, and 
principles of the Parties. 
Furthermore, even if there was not a clear statement of intention 
confirming an interpretation of obligation on the Parties, it is a rule of treaty 
construction that they should be construed liberally.210  Article 17 bis can be 
interpreted broadly to either create a right or not.  If the language of Article 
17 bis is viewed as merely a hortatory statement of support for high labor 
standards, then Parties are denied a right of enforcement when those 
standards are diminished.  Instead, a more liberal construction would 
interpret the article to create a separate right of enforcement; whereby, a 
Party can act when another nation to the Agreement intentionally undermines 
labor standards.  On the other hand, paragraph two does contemplate “regular 
consideration . . . of the societal effects of the Agreement” by the Joint 
Commission.211 
Nevertheless, this should not be construed as a limit on the remedial 
powers of the Parties nor should it be viewed as reducing the obligation on 
the Parties to refrain from intentionally undermining labor standards.  The 
                                                                                                                   
 207 2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 4. 
 208 Avero Belgium Ins. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Although a 
State’s consent to be bound by an international agreement can take many forms, including 
formal accession to the treaty’s provisions after the treaty has already entered into force, 
ratification remains the most common form . . . by which a state becomes bound by an 
international agreement.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 209 2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 4. 
 210 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985). 
 211 2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 4. 
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Joint Commission (JC or the Commission) is the primary mechanism for 
resolving conflicts arising from the Agreement and creating cooperation and 
evaluating implementation of the Agreement.212  The Commission is not 
responsible for implementing the Agreement; instead, the Commission 
facilitates the Parties’ cooperation as each carries out the Agreement.  The 
Commission can act as a method for remedying purported violations of the 
Agreement, but its authority is not exclusive.  Therefore, under a liberal 
construction, Parties are obligated to implement the Agreement without 
intentionally violating Article 17 bis, but if a Party does violate it, then the 
opposing Party may enforce its rights through the Commission. 
Under the U.S. judicial approach to treaty interpretation, extrinsic 
evidence may additionally be considered to discern the meaning of a treaty, 
including the treaty’s history, prior negotiations, and practical construction 
by the Parties themselves.213  The first round of negotiations began with 
Daniel Calleja, Director of Air Transport for the European Commission, 
noting that providing protection for labor standards was one of three large 
concerns left over from the first stage of the ATA.214  Later that year he 
would echo the same concerns about labor in a speech to the International 
Aviation Club.215  These concerns permeated through each round of the 
negotiations with special attention being given to the views espoused by 
labor stakeholders in the second labor forum.216  In fact, labor concerns were 
one of the only issues that were addressed so vigorously in the interim 
between the 2007 Agreement and the 2010 amendments.  Drafters and other 
stakeholders involved in the two forums were unified in their insistence for 
tangible labor protections abroad, fearing that liberalization would reduce 
preexisting standards.217  The ATA negotiation history reinforces an 
interpretation of Article 17 bis that favors imposing an obligation on Parties 
to not act intentionally to undermine preexisting labor standards.  
On the other hand, there is no practical construction to Article 17 bis.  
Through the conflict over NAI’s permit application, the Parties have their 
first opportunity to interpret the language of Article 17 bis.  Both Parties 
largely maintained opposing views of Article 17 bis enforcement power.  
                                                                                                                   
 212 2007 Agreement, supra note 94, art. 18.  
 213 See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991). 
 214 Daniel Calleja, Dir. Air Transp., Directorate-Gen. for Energy and Transport, Euro. 
Comm. Presentation EU-US Second Stage: The Future of Transatlantic Aviation (May 15, 
2008).  
 215 Daniel Calleja, Dir. Air. Transp., Eur. Comm’n, Speech to the International Aviation 
Club: EU-US Aviation: Rising to the Challenges (Sept. 23, 2008).  
 216 Negotiations on a Second Stage EU-U.S. Air Transport Agreement, Joint Statement from 
the European and U.S. Delegations.  
 217 SECOND AVIATION FORUM, supra note 118. 
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Despite this conflict, the plain language and clear intent of the Parties show 
Article 17 bis was not meant to be a meager nod to the concerns of labor, 
but, instead, was meant to be a controlling principle in the Parties’ actions 
under the Agreement. 
Nonetheless, general counsel for the USDOT argues that paragraph two 
of Article 17 bis is “essentially hortatory” and should not be understood to 
impose any legal obligation on the Parties.218  Likewise, counsel for the 
Department of State argues, “[Article 17 bis] does not authorize actions that 
would run counter to express legal obligations of the Parties under other 
provisions of the Agreement—such as the obligation . . . to grant a permit 
where Article 4’s requirements are satisfied.”219  Yet, each of these fails to 
accept the plain language of the provision and clearly stated objective to take 
no intentional action to undermine labor standards of the respective nations.  
As noted above, the USDOT argument that the language was meant as only a 
general observance of the value of high labor standards would make the 
entire Article merely superfluous, which is contrary to maxims of treaty 
interpretation.  Additionally, the State Department’s argument fails to 
appreciate that, taken in its plain and ordinary meaning, the requirements of 
Article 4 could not be properly satisfied without passing Article 17 bis 
explicit prohibition against intentionally conflicting labor decisions.  The 
drafters of Article 17 bis are clear that their intention was to protect labor 
standards, and the Parties have a duty to do nothing that would intentionally 
undermine that protection.  
B.  The Legal Obligation Under Article 17 bis Extends to Article 4 
Authorizations 
Since Article 17 bis imposes a duty on the Parties to not intentionally 
undermine labor standards through the Agreement processes, the USDOT is 
not permitted to grant a foreign air carrier permit under Article 4 if Article 17 
bis is violated.  The criteria for authorizing foreign air carrier permits 
includes national standards for review, which in the United States means a 
holistic and public examination of the public interest in authorizing the 
permit.  This approach, at least with regards to the U.S. domestic law, 
arguably compels the USDOT to deny a foreign air carrier permit for an 
airline shirking preexisting labor standards.   
                                                                                                                   
 218 Letter from Kathryn B. Thompson, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Transp. to Karl R. Thompson, 
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Re: DOT Legal Analysis 
of Article 17 bis of the U.S.-EU Aviation Agreement (Mar. 17, 2016).  
 219 Letter from Brian J. Egan, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State to Karl Thompson, Principal 
Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel (Apr. 13, 2016).  
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Article 17 bis applies to the entire ATA.  The drafters put no limitations 
on the provision’s applicability, and the Article clearly states that the duty 
applies throughout the entirety of the Agreement’s implementation.220  
Comparably, other amended provisions are limited in their scope by express 
language to a referenced article or annex, but Article 17 bis makes no such 
limitation.221  For example, Article 6 bis is made “pursuant to Article 4,” and 
Article 15 must be read “in accordance with Article 2 and 3(4).”222  No 
limiting principle for its application is provided in the text of Article 17 bis, 
so it would apply to authorizations under Article 4. Additionally, Article 17 
bis can be read in harmony with the entirety of the other provisions of the 
Agreement.  Nothing in either the 2007 Agreement or the 2010 Amendment 
makes explicit reference to Article 17 bis or rejects its broad application.223  
Thus, it presumably applies to all provisions of the ATA. 
Under Article 4, Parties must grant certificates to foreign air carriers 
seeking authorization who meet the requisite standards.  The Party must 
grant authorization if the airline demonstrates: (1) it is owned and controlled 
by the appropriate state; (2) it is “qualified to meet the conditions prescribed 
under the laws and regulations” normally considered by the granting 
authority; and (3) it meets the provisions of Article 8 (safety) and Article 9 
(security).224  The first standard is defined in Annex 4 to the ATA, explaining 
ownership and control requirements generally under the Agreement. 
Likewise, the third element’s requirements, safety and security standards, are 
provided in Articles 8 and 9 respectively.  The second standard is not defined 
in the Agreement because its content derives from the laws and regulations 
of the nation authorizing the foreign air carrier permit.  Accordingly, Article 
17 bis is most applicable in element two—the Parties’ preexisting 
qualifications and conditions for authorization. 
Specifically, an airline applying to the USDOT for a foreign air carrier 
permit to fly routes into the United States would be evaluated on an overall 
standard—“a public interest test.”225  For authorization to be granted, the 
airline must demonstrate citizenship and fitness.  An airline can prove 
citizenship by demonstrating it is substantially owned and effectively 
controlled by an appropriate state or a national of that state.  Fitness includes 
                                                                                                                   
 220 2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 4. 
 221 See id. art. 5 (“provided for in Article 3” and “with respect to application of paragraph 6 
of Article 11”). 
 222 Id.  
 223 2007 Agreement, supra note 94; 2010 Agreement, supra note 148.  
 224 2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 4.  
 225 Office of Int’l Aviation Foreign Air Carrier Licensing Div., Foreign Air Carrier 
Information Packet, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Sept. 2000), https://www.transportation.gov/site 
s/dot.dev/files/docs/Foreign_Carrier_Information_Packet.pdf.  
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both operational and financial fitness as well as a disposition to “comply 
with the laws, regulations, and requirements which govern the operation of 
such services.”226  Nonetheless, these determinations are not dispositive of 
whether a foreign air carrier permit is granted because the USDOT will 
consider additional factors.  For example, when an airline applies for 
authorization, the application is made public, and interested Parties may 
comment on the proposed authorization.227  This commentary—responsive 
pleadings filed by external Parties—may be considered in the overall 
weighing of whether to grant a carrier an authorization.228      
When weighed together for the public interest test, the USDOT must deny 
authorization to an airline that demonstrates labor practices that undermine 
the standards approved by either the United States, EU, or the member states.  
Expressly, the “merits of any responsive pleadings . . . filed to the 
application” may be properly considered in evaluating the public interest.229  
In cases where the pleadings show an airline has consciously subverted labor 
standards, Article 17 bis bars authorization because granting the application 
would intentionally undermine those standards.  Arguably, granting such an 
application may only reflect a decision that, at most, knowingly undermined 
standards or just consciously disregarded them, failing to rise to the level of 
intentionality.  Yet, the purpose of Article 17 bis is to prevent flagrant 
circumvention of labor standards, so intentionality should be read to include 
these lessor culpabilities.230  Hence, under the public interest analysis, the 
USDOT is compelled to deny those applications where improper labor 
practices are found to exist. 
However, in the 2010 Amendment the Joint Committee approved 
procedures to provide reciprocal recognition of the opposite Parties’ 
regulatory determinations, including citizenship and fitness.231  Whereby, the 
USDOT should “not inquire further” except where there is a “specific reason 
for concern” that the standards of Article 4 have not been met.232  This 
                                                                                                                   
 226 Office of the Sec’y of Transp., Office of Int’l Aviation, Procedures for the Reciprocal 
Recognition of Regulatory Determinations with Regard to Airline Fitness and Citizenship, 
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Feb. 19, 2009).  
 227 49 U.S.C. § 41305(a)(2) (“When an application is filed, the Secretary shall post a notice 
of the application . . . An interested person may file a response with the Secretary opposing or 
supporting the issuance of the permit.”).  
 228 Office of the Sec’y of Transp., supra note 226. 
 229 Office of Int’l Aviation Foreign Air Carrier Licensing Div., supra note 225. 
 230 Porcari, supra note 5 (“[A] decision whether or not to grant operating authority based on 
compliance with Article 17 is at the heart of implementation of the ATA.”). 
 231 2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 2 (amending Article 6 of the 2007 Agreement); 
Office of the Sec’y Transp., Application Procedures for Foreign Air Carriers of the European 
Union, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Feb. 19, 2009).     
 232 2010 Agreement, supra note 148, art. 2 (amending Article 6 of the 2007 Agreement). 
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agreement simply creates a fast-lane for approving foreign air carrier permits 
by reducing the evidentiary burden on the applicant.233  The purpose of the 
agreement is to encourage greater cooperation in setting standards and 
comity in implementing the ATA.  The drafters clearly state that it does not 
reduce or modify the conditions required by granting nations to properly 
authorize a permit.234  Thus, a foreign air carrier must still meet the requisite 
standards of the USDOT to be granted an authorization, even under 
reciprocal recognition. 
Conversely, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of Legal Counsel 
argues that the USDOT could not deny an air carrier permit to an ATA 
member state under Article 17 bis.235  The DOJ attempts to diminish the 
article’s power by merely examining it on an independent basis, separate and 
distinct from the rest of the authorization process, for revoking a carrier 
permit from an airline otherwise qualified to receive it.  This misses the point 
entirely. Under a proper reading of the Agreement, an airline would never be 
qualified to receive Article 4 authorization unless it preliminarily satisfied 
Article 17 bis.  The provision imposes an Agreement-wide duty on the 
Parties to act in a certain way, and it should not be read as an after-the-fact 
consideration merely because it comes later in the Agreement.  Accordingly, 
the DOJ’s argument fails because the starting premise misconstrues the 
proper process of evaluating an air carrier authorization application under the 
USDOT rules and the ATA.  
Parties are proscribed from intentionally undermining labor standards per 
Article 17 bis in their actions under the ATA.  The USDOT examines a host 
of factors in evaluating whether to grant a foreign air carrier authorization, 
including the public commentary on applications.  If these pleadings reveal 
sufficient evidence of poor labor practices by the applicant, then the USDOT 
must deny authorization under Article 4 and 17 bis.  Considering this 
                                                                                                                   
 233 Office of the Sec’y of Transp., Office of Int’l Aviation, Application Procedures for 
Foreign Air Carriers of the European Union, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (“Under this 
arrangement, the U.S. Department of Transportation uses determinations made by aeronautical 
authorities of Member States on the fitness and citizenship of their air carriers, rather than 
basing these findings on detailed evidentiary submissions. . . .”).  
 234 2010 Agreement, supra note 148, Memorandum of Consultations, para. 5 (“The 
delegations affirmed that the procedures for reciprocal recognition of regulatory 
determinations with regard to airline fitness and citizenship in the new Article 6 bis are not 
intended to modify the conditions prescribed under the laws and regulations normally applied 
by the Parties. . . .”). 
 235 Karl R. Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
Memorandum Opinion for the General Counsel: Interpretation of Article 17 Bis of the U.S.-
EU Air Transport Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Apr. 14, 2016).  
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framework, the question remains whether the USDOT should have granted 
NAI’s authorization application.  
C.  NAI Arbitration: Violations of Labor Standards Under the ATA 
On December 2, 2016, the USDOT impermissibly approved NAI’s 
application for a foreign air carrier permit.236  NAI labor practices arguably 
undermine labor standards in the United States and parts of the EU.  In 
examining the extensive application docket of NAI, it’s clear NAI operates 
to the detriment of labor.237  These filings (over three hundred) triggered the 
USDOT to suspend its normal granting permission, resulting in the case 
being brought to arbitration under Article 19 of the ATA.238  As explained 
below, NAI uses atypical employment practices, which circumvent the 
Parties’ respective labor laws altogether.  This circumvention defies the 
purpose of Article 17 bis and constitutes a clear violation of the prohibition 
against intentionally undermining labor standards.  
1.  Relevant Background to NAI Application 
Following the passage of the ATA, EU carriers began taking advantage of 
the expansive airline market and new access it created.  NAI, a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Norwegian Air Shuttle (NAS), was created under an 
Irish Air Operator Certificate (AOC) in 2013.239  Later that year it applied for 
a foreign carrier permit, as permitted for Irish carriers under the ATA,240 to 
begin operating a transatlantic route but was met with staunch opposition.241  
Just thirteen days after NAI filed its application, Delta Air Lines, Inc., United 
Airlines, Inc., and American Airlines, Inc. filed a joint response to NAI’s 
                                                                                                                   
 236 Hugo Martin, Norwegian Air International Gets Final Approval for Flights to U.S., 
Despite Opposition, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-norwe 
gian-air-20161202-story.html. 
 237 See complete docket of all filings regarding NAI application for a foreign air carrier 
permit at https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=DOT-OST-2013-0204. 
 238 2007 Agreement, supra note 94. 
 239 Valerie Silva, From Inauguration to Arbitration: Norwegian Air International’s Brief, 
Entangled History, APEX (Aug. 9, 2016), http://apex.aero/2016/08/09/inauguration-arbitratio 
n-norwegian-air-international-history.  
 240 This is also granted to Norwegian air carriers as Norway was admitted under the 2011 
amendment to the ATA.   
 241 From the time of the application filing for a foreign air carrier permit with the USDOT 
until the department finally issued a show cause order, over 300 pleadings, motions, letters, 
and comments were directed at the department with varying degrees of support.  See the 
complete docket of all filings regarding NAI application for a foreign air carrier permit (DOT-
OST-2013-0204), https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=25&so=ASC&sb=comm 
entDueDate&po=25&dct=N%2BFR%2BPR%2BO&D=DOT-OST-2013-0204. 
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application calling into question its Irish AOC as a deliberate attempt to 
circumvent Norwegian tax and labor laws.242  This claim was echoed by 
various labor unions and organizations, similarly filing documents with the 
court challenging NAI’s employment record and motives for inaugurating in 
Ireland, stating that Ireland merely operated as a “flag of convenience” for 
NAI.243  
This opposition forced the USDOT to withhold granting NAI a foreign 
carrier permit.  Finally, on April 25, 2016, the USDOT issued a “show cause 
order.”244  In the order the USDOT explained that the situation was “novel 
and complex,” such that additional review was necessary.245  Though the 
USDOT did stipulate that legal counsel had concluded Article 17 bis did not 
create an independent basis for denying authorization where the carrier 
otherwise met all the required standards of Article 4, it still refrained from 
giving such authorization.246  The USDOT construction of Article 17 bis 
incorrectly interprets the plain meaning of the text and the purpose behind 
the article.  Considering the aforementioned construction of Article 17 bis 
and 4, the USDOT incorrectly granted NAI’s authorization since its 
employment practices undermine labor.  An examination of their labor 
practices shows they contravene the principles and laws of the United States 
and EU nations.   
2.  Evidentiary Analysis 
The responsive pleadings to NAI’s application for authorization reveal 
labor practices that undermine labor principles and high standards.  
Examining the USDOT record, the Joint Answer of the three large U.S. 
carriers (Delta, United, and American) accuses NAI of operating under an 
Irish flag merely as a “flag of convenience” in order to avoid certain taxes 
and continue to use suspect employment practices, which might otherwise 
violate Norwegian law.247  Focusing primarily on the accusation of suspect 
                                                                                                                   
 242 Joint Answer, supra note 3. 
 243 The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), Transportation Trades Department (TTD), 
AFL-CIO, European Cockpit Association (ECA), Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, 
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, and Transport Workers 
Union of America all jointly and separately filed motions with the court challenging NAI’s 
application as contrary to the “public interest” due to their labor practices.   
 244 U.S. DOT Issues Proposed Order on Norwegian Order International, U.S. DEP’T OF 
TRANSP. (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-dot-issues-propos 
ed-order-norwegian-order-international. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Silva, supra note 239.  
 247 Joint Answer, supra note 3. 
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labor practices, the docket folder reveals a litany of organizations and 
stakeholders who similarly argue that NAI’s labor practices are violations of 
existing U.S. and EU law.  For example, Peter DeFazio, Ranking Member of 
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, challenged NAI’s authorization specifically because of its use 
of “outsourced crews” contracted under Singapore law,248 believing that such 
actions are “anathema to the strong labor protections” of Europe and the 
United States.249  Defazio and the three U.S. carriers are not alone in voicing 
these specific concerns.  
During the initial response period for NAI’s application, labor 
organizations raised concerns about NAI’s labor practices.  They specifically 
identified two critical questions regarding labor that the USDOT needed to 
further inspect: (1) NAI’s proposed labor and staffing models and (2) the 
terms and conditions of employment governing NAI’s flight crews.250  The 
answers to these two questions reveal the reasonable concerns labor 
organizations have surrounding a USDOT authorization’s effect on existing 
labor standards. 
First, NAI employs cabin crews and pilots through a decentralized, 
atypical model. NAI an Irish carrier wholly owned by its Norwegian parent 
company, NAS, has moved most of its business away from Norway, 
establishing bases in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the U.K., Spain, Bangkok, 
and the United States.251  At these foreign bases, NAI uses temporary work 
agencies to recruit both general employees and cabin crews, resulting in “less 
than half of the total cabin crew” of NAI being permanently employed.252  
Second, NAI pilots are employed through one of three methods: (1) 
permanently employed, (2) hired through temporary work agencies, or (3) 
self-employed who generally hire themselves out to a temporary work 
agency.253  Under methods two and three, NAI is not always contracting with 
                                                                                                                   
 248 Singapore offers protections for domestic labor but does not have the same 
comprehensive scheme for foreign nationals independently contracted under their domestic 
laws.  
 249 Letter from Peter DeFazio, Rep. House Comm. Transp. & Infrastructure, to Violeta Bulc, 
EU Comm’n for Transp. (July 28, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OS 
T-2013-0204-15116.  
 250 Answer of Allied Pilots Association to Summary of Information Provided by the 
European Delegation Regarding Application of Norwegian Air International Limited for an 
Exemption and Foreign Air Carrier Permit, Application of Norwegian Air International 
Limited, No. OST-2013-0204 (Feb. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Answer of Allied Pilots 
Association].   
 251 Y. JORENS, D. GILLIS, L. VALCKE & J. DE CONINCK, ATYPICAL FORMS OF EMPLOYMENT IN 
THE AVIATION SECTOR 56 (European Comm’n ed., 2015). 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. at 68. 
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the individual employee; instead, the pilot usually contracts with the 
temporary work agency under a self-employed status or as an employee of 
the agency.254  NAI then negotiates with the hiring agency to determine flight 
assignments between the pilot and the airline.255  
In comparison, SAS and Widerøe, the other two largest Norwegian air 
carriers, use a more traditional employment model.256  These companies 
largely employ both cabin crews and pilots through permanent contracts.257  
They do not rely on third parties to hire personnel, and they generally prefer 
to handle most employment decisions within the confines of the company.258  
Under this centralized employment model, the employment contracts of both 
cabin crews and pilots are controlled by Norwegian contract and labor law.  
NAI’s hiring methods have triggered concerns about poorer working 
conditions, lower compensation, and general job insecurity—or “social 
dumping.”259  Under these contracts, pilots are held to be employees of the 
hiring agency, not the airline; therefore, the contract law of the nation where 
the hiring agency is domiciled would control.260  For example, NAS and NAI 
use OSM Aviation Ltd., a NAS-majority owned employment agency, for 
some of its hiring but multi-sources a lot of its temporary hiring through 
regional agencies.261 One such regional temporary hiring agency, Global 
Crew Asia Pte. Ltd. (Global Crew),262 allegedly is an attempt by NAI to 
circumvent standard labor protections of Norway and the EU.263 As 
employees of Singaporean Global Crew, NAI’s pilots and crews are 
generally paid local salaries, which can be lower than their European 
counterparts.264 Additionally, these hiring agencies are permitted to charge 
recruitment fees (headhunting fees), which are carried by the hired workers 
                                                                                                                   
 254 Id. at 69. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. at 68. 
 257 Id.  
 258 Id. at 56. 
 259 Philip von Schöppenthau, European Cockpit Ass’n, Answer of European Cockpit 
Association to Application of Norwegian Air International Limited for an Exemption and 
Foreign Air Carrier Permit, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Dec. 17, 2013). 
 260 JORENS, GILLIS, VALCKE & DE CONINCK, supra note 251, at 69.  
 261 Commission Decision (EC) No. 139/2004 of 31 May 2016, art. 6(1)(b), 2016 O.J. (C 
248) 2, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7949_400_3.pdf. 
 262 The U.K. company registrar, Companies House, lists Global Crew Asia Pte. Ltd. as an 
airline pilot employment company, operating out of Gatwick Airport but based in Singapore. 
More information can be obtained at https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/BR017415. 
 263 See Comments of Southwest Airlines Pilots Association Opposing Approval of 
Norwegian Air International Limited for a Foreign Air Carrier Permit, No. OST-2013-0204 
(Dec. 23, 2013).  
 264 See generally JORENS, GILLIS, VALCKE & DE CONINCK, supra note 251, at 69. 
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themselves not the air carriers.265  These “migration loans” can provide 
leverage against workers wanting to speak out.266  Additionally, Singapore 
law does not provide for unemployment benefits for either domestic or 
foreign workers.267  Thus, workers hired under this framework will face 
substantial limitations to their ability to collectively bargain because of the 
fractured nature of their employment and the little leverage they hold against 
management.  
Labor organizations who opposed NAI’s application pointed to this 
employment structure as evidence that they undermine Western labor 
standards.  They argue that NAI obtained an Irish AOC in order to 
intentionally circumvent stricter Norwegian labor laws on collective 
bargaining, allowing them to create a competitive advantage by offering 
lower fares because they are not paying normal labor costs.268  In response, 
NAI asserted that they would rely primarily on flight crews based in Europe 
and the United States, generally placing the most employees in the areas 
servicing the most routes.269  If a crewmember is asked to fly a transatlantic 
or long haul flight, it is due to “extraordinary and unforeseen operations 
reasons” rather than intentional circumvention.270  Moreover, NAI rebutted 
accusations of ‘social dumping,’ citing competitive compensation levels 
across all of its bases.271  And while many contracts are controlled by Thai or 
Singaporean law, Kjos stressed that use of employment agencies was a 
transitional strategy, and employees purportedly have always been given an 
option to have employment contracts governed under the Norwegian law.272 
NAI’s atypical employment method undermines U.S. and EU labor 
protections for employees meant to be effectuated by Article 17 bis.  In the 
complex world of international corporate laws governing civil aviation, 
airlines must remain competitive to stay above the global competition.  
Reducing labor costs is an effective means for doing this; however, those 
reductions cannot come at the cost of providing essential protections.  The 
                                                                                                                   
 265 Yap Mui Teng, Singapore’s System for Managing Foreign Manpower, in MANAGING 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FOR DEVELOPMENT IN EAST ASIA 238 (R.H. Adams, Jr. & A. 
Ahsan eds., 2014). 
 266 Id.  
 267 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS: SINGAPORE (2003).  
 268 Answer of Allied Pilots Association, supra note 250. 
 269 Letter from Bjørn Kjos, CEO Norwegian Grp., to Anthony Foxx, Sec’y of Transp., Dep’t 
of Transp. (June 1, 2015), http://3rxg9qea18zhtl6s2u8jammft-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-co 
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employment practices of NAI harm both individual employees and labor 
practices more generally. 
First, NAI’s use of third-party hiring through temporary work agencies 
harm the individual employees by denying them both labor protections and 
social benefits.  A European pilot hired through a work agency like Global 
Crew is not employed by NAI.  When issues on flights arise or concerns over 
work conditions occur, the employee will not be able to resolve these with 
NAI.   The employee must address said concerns with Global Crew, which 
could mean his unilateral termination or removal from those routes.  Under 
the model there is no formal mechanism for improving working conditions or 
advancing oneself in NAI since the employee does not actually work for 
NAI.  As an employee of the Singaporean company, employee public health 
benefits typically provided through an employer will not be required.  For 
example, the employee will lose out on essential insurance and 
unemployment benefits.  These concerns certainly threaten to undermine an 
individual’s ability to protect himself from potential harms created from an 
imbalance in bargaining power.  
Second, at a macro level, labor standards will be undermined because 
permitting NAI to continue to exercise under this model will either 
encourage other air carriers to follow suit or compel them in order to reduce 
labor costs to remain competitive in the market.  This decentralized 
employment model would impede most collective bargaining arrangements. 
Considering the different approaches advanced at the second labor forum, 
none of them are viable if these systems can proliferate.273  Transnational 
agreements require an organized labor body to function as the corporate 
body, but these temporary hiring agencies can refuse to hire pilots or crews 
affiliated with such groups, effectively eliminating them.  Whereas, 
European Works Councils, transnational conventions, and common standards 
would be incapable of advancing labor protections because those agreements 
bind nations’ conduct and companies working within those legal parameters.  
As seen from NAI, those standards are a small impediment to a company that 
completely circumvents those laws and standards.  
Indeed, under this model there is little to no protection afforded to labor 
individually or collectively.  The USDOT should have given greater weight 
to the public interest test to determine whether granting an authorization 
would intentionally undermine labor standards of the United States or the 
EU, which would have likely led to a denial of a foreign air carrier permit for 
NAI. It is apparent that their third-party hiring strategies undermine labor by 
                                                                                                                   
 273 As mentioned in Section II, part D, pp. 527–33, note the different models for collective 
bargaining.  
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attempting to avoid high standards.  Though the issue has been settled, the 
USDOT should, nevertheless, remain adamant in the future to avoid 
approving suspect labor practices for subsequent carriers. 
V.  LOOKING FORWARD 
The USDOT has explicitly stated Article 17 bis cannot be an independent 
ground for denying authorization to an otherwise qualified carrier, and it has 
granted NAI’s application despite genuine labor concerns.  In response to 
NAI’s application and the subsequent arbitration, representatives in Congress 
drafted a resolution, H.R. 2997, that would empower the Secretary of 
Transportation to act on labor violations under Article 17 bis.  However, if 
passed this resolution might impede ongoing cooperation from the EU or 
even risk dissolution of the entire open skies framework.  At the same time, 
the third stage of the open skies agreement may provide a more effective and 
balanced approach to these issues, without risking the entirety of the 
agreement.  
A.  Impending U.S. Resolutions 
On June 22, 2017, Representative Bill Shuster (Pennsylvania), along with 
Representatives LoBiondo, Graves, Mitchell, Hanabusa, and Sinema 
introduced H.R. 2997, cited as the “21st Century Aviation Innovation, 
Reform, and Reauthorization Act” or “21st Century AIRR Act.”274  Though 
the AIRR Act would primarily privatize U.S. air traffic control, as amended, 
it would also bar the Secretary of Transportation from issuing permits or 
exceptions for foreign air carriers when an “interested party” has raised the 
“applicability of Article 17 bis” of the ATA.275  Nevertheless, the Secretary 
could grant a permit if she (1) “finds that issuing the permit or exception 
would be consistent with the intent [of Article 17 bis]” and 
“imposes . . . such conditions as may be necessary to ensure that the person 
complies with the intent of Article 17 bis.”276  Under subsection (b), the 
AIRR Act would fundamentally amend the “public interest test” used by the 
USDOT in granting foreign air carrier permits to include “preventing 
                                                                                                                   
 274 21st Century Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization Act, H.R. 2997, 115th 
Cong. (2017) [hereinafter AIRR Act].  
 275 Id. § 631(a). Section 631 is an amendment proposed by New Jersey Rep. LoBiondo to 
undue the NAI decision by incorporating H.R. 5090, a bill that died in committee last term. 
See H.R. 5090, 114th Cong. (2016) (prohibiting the Secretary of Transp. from approving 
foreign air carrier permits, unless doing so would be consistent with Article 17 bis of the 
ATA, including empowering the Secretary to impose conditions to meet that standard). 
 276 AIRR Act, supra note 274, § 631(a)(1)–(2). 
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entry . . . by flag of convenience carriers.”277  As of this writing in 2017, the 
resolution only has twenty-two cosponsors and has not left committee.  
Section 631 of the bill does exactly what the general counsel argued 
Article 17 bis was unable to do—act as an independent means for denying an 
air carrier permit. Though, the AIRR Act does not require evidence of 
Article 17 bis violation only its “applicability,” which is a lower threshold.278 
Under traditional canons of interpretation, the AIRR Act would abrogate the 
ATA because it would be ‘last in time’ and has a clear Congressional 
purpose to override the ATA.279  Undoubtedly, approval of the bill would 
trigger an immediate response from the EU.  The EU has been outspoken 
about their desire to liberalize the international airline industry and create a 
single aviation market, so this will likely appear as a threat to that goal.  
However, the EU cannot act as easily as the United States to curb this 
threat. Since the EU has no singular law-making ability, it would be 
restricted to adopting a directive encompassing similar restrictions that 
Member States would be free to individually accept.  Otherwise, the EU 
could unilaterally reject the ATA altogether.  Although, this latter choice 
would appear drastic and would threaten the entire international airline 
industry.  Nonetheless, the EU may be able to leverage this power to 
encourage Congress or President Trump to either reject H.R. 2997 or create 
more cooperative measures at a third stage of negotiations.  Either way H.R. 
2997 threatens the stability of open skies agreements between the United 
States and the EU.  
B.  Multinational Options 
Absent a willingness to reach a bipartisan understanding of Article 17 bis 
by both the United States and the EU, the issue should be addressed through 
a third stage of negotiations on the ATA.  Both the parties and external 
commentators noted the vast amount of work that still is required before the 
single aviation market can be reached, but by continuing to encourage 
                                                                                                                   
 277 Id. § 631(b).  According to the AIRR Act, a “flag of convenience carrier” would include 
a “foreign air carrier that is established in a country other than the home country of its 
majority owner or owners in order to avoid regulations of the home country.” Id. § 631(c). 
 278 Id. § 631(a). 
 279 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (explaining that treaties and 
Congressional acts should be construed to give both effect; however, if in conflict then “the 
one last in date will control the other . . .”); accord Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 
(1933) (explaining that treaty abrogation by subsequent statute is only appropriate if 
Congressional intent is clearly expressed). 
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liberalization the goal can be reached.280  During those negotiations, labor 
must remain at the forefront of the parties’ agendas.  
The EU is far more concerned with opening ownership rights for carriers 
in the U.S. market, but the United States has rebuked these attempts because 
of the fear that the domestic industry will be eliminated.  Labor organizations 
similarly fear an opening of ownership rights because it may mean a “race to 
the bottom” where little protection is afforded.  If the parties can 
constructively outline a plan to make some concessions to ownership rights, 
the United States may be able to bargain for greater labor protections going 
forward.  
However, considering President Trump’s proposed plan to re-negotiate 
bad deals and bring jobs back to the nation, this goal may be less achievable 
than previously believed.  While still very unknown, some initial indications 
show that President Trump may advance more protectionist arguments in 
negotiating deals.  This will likely limit any further progress on increased 
liberalization, and it may have a negative impact by creating increased 
limitations on the existing agreement. 
Whatever the next steps taken, the stakeholders on both sides of the 
Atlantic should consider the lessons of the 1980s airline deregulation.  Labor 
and management are both necessary to the progress of the airline industry, 
and opening markets can equally advance the interests of both if done 
through a cooperative framework.  That framework may be limited if strict 
protectionist measures are advanced by either Party.  Instead, competition 
should be promoted, and it can be advanced alongside proper standards for 
contracting employees and requisite schemes in certain jurisdictions.  
Airlines in the market must remain flexible and competitive to respond to 
changing demands, but they must equally remain considerate of the vast 
array of stakeholders who are codependent on them for their livelihood. 
 
                                                                                                                   
 280  In light of Brexit, third stage negotiations are a foregone conclusion to occur; however, 
the manner in which Brexit plays into the negotiations is beyond the purview of this Note. 
